Dynamic Games and Applications

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 141–156 | Cite as

Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games

  • Dharini Hingu
  • K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao
  • A. J. Shaiju


Asymptotic stability of equilibrium in evolutionary games with continuous action spaces is an important question. Existing results in the literature require that the equilibrium state be monomorphic. In this article, we address this question when the equilibrium is polymorphic. We show that any uninvadable and finitely supported state is asymptotically stable equilibrium of replicator equation.


Evolutionary games Continuous action spaces ESS Replicator dynamics Stability 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dharini Hingu
    • 1
  • K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao
    • 2
  • A. J. Shaiju
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsIndian Institute of Technology MadrasChennaiIndia
  2. 2.School of Industrial Engineering and Operations ResearchIndian Institute of Technology BombayMumbaiIndia

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