Dynamic Games and Applications

, Volume 6, Issue 4, pp 520–537 | Cite as

The Subgame-Consistent Shapley Value for Dynamic Network Games with Shock

  • Leon Petrosyan
  • Artem Sedakov


In the paper, cooperative repeated network games containing network formation stages are studied. After the first network formation stage, a particular player with a given probability may stop influencing other players by removing all her links and receiving zero payoffs. This effect is called “shock.” The effect of shock may appear only once, and the stage number, at which shock appears, is chosen at random. In the cooperative scenario of the game, subgame consistency of the Shapley value, based on a characteristic function, which is constructed in a special way, is investigated. To prevent players from breaking the cooperative agreement, a mechanism of stage payments—so-called imputation distribution procedure—is designed.


Discrete-time games  Network formation Cooperation Imputation Subgame consistency 

Mathematics Subject Classification

90B15 91A12 91A20 



We thank three anonymous referees for their comments that have helped in the improvement of the paper. We also thank the audience of the 20th Conference of the International Federation of Operational Research Societies for helpful discussion and suggestions.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control ProcessesSaint Petersburg State UniversitySaint PetersburgRussia

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