Dynamic Games and Applications

, Volume 3, Issue 4, pp 446–472 | Cite as

A Mean Field Capital Accumulation Game with HARA Utility

  • Minyi HuangEmail author


This paper introduces a mean field modeling framework for consumption-accumulation optimization. The production dynamics are generalized from stochastic growth theory by addressing the collective impact of a large population of similar agents on efficiency. This gives rise to a stochastic dynamic game with mean field coupling in the dynamics, where we adopt a hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility functional for the agents. A set of decentralized strategies is obtained by using the Nash certainty equivalence approach. To examine the long-term behavior we introduce a notion called the relaxed stationary mean field solution. The simple strategy computed from this solution is used to investigate the out-of-equilibrium behavior of the mean field system. Interesting nonlinear phenomena can emerge, including stable equilibria, limit cycles and chaos, which are related to the agent’s sensitivity to the mean field.


Stochastic growth Investment Consumption Externality Mean field approximation Nash equilibrium Out-of-equilibrium behavior 



This work was partially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Mathematics and StatisticsCarleton UniversityOttawaCanada

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