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Dynamic Games and Applications

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 24–37 | Cite as

Hawks and Doves in a Dynamic Framework

  • Yezekael HayelEmail author
  • E. Veronica Belmega
  • Eitan Altman
Article

Abstract

We revisit, in this paper, the well-studied Hawk and Dove game within a dynamic framework. A non-standard evolutionary game approach is taken, in which the starting point of the modeling is the dynamic evolution of the population as a function of the strategies used, instead of a fitness-based model (in which the fitness functions determine the evolution). This work is motivated by the discussion in the book of Thomas L. Vincent co-authored with J. Brown (Evolutionary game theory, natural selection and Darwinian dynamics) in which they raise (on p. 73) the puzzling question of whom should one consider to be the players: the individuals or the populations?

Keywords

Evolutionary games Hawk and Dove Dynamic systems 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yezekael Hayel
    • 1
    Email author
  • E. Veronica Belmega
    • 2
  • Eitan Altman
    • 3
  1. 1.LIA/CERIUniversity of AvignonAvignonFrance
  2. 2.ETIS/ENSEAUniversité de Cergy-Pontoise, CNRSCergy-PontoiseFrance
  3. 3.INRIA Sophia-AntipolisSophia-AntipolisFrance

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