Stochasticity and Time Delays in Evolutionary Games

Open Access


We discuss combined effects of stochasticity and time delays in simple evolutionary games with a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy. We present three models of time-delay stochastic dynamics of finite well-mixed or random-matching populations. We show that in the first two models the evolutionarily stable strategy loses its stability and there appears a stable cycle around it with the time period and the amplitude proportional to the delay. In the third model, only one randomly chosen individual can update his strategy at a time. This slows down the dynamics and makes the evolutionarily stable strategy stable with respect to both time delay and stochastic perturbations.


Evolutionary game theory Time delay Stochastic dynamics Stochastic stability Stable cycles 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Applied Mathematics and MechanicsUniversity of WarsawWarsawPoland

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