, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 137–153 | Cite as

Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes

  • María Gómez-Rúa
Open Access
Original Article


n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem.


Cost sharing Pollutant-cleaning cost Water taxes 

JEL Classification

C71 D61 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2011

This article is published under license to BioMed Central Ltd. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Research Group in Economic Analysis, Facultade de CC. Económicas e EmpresariaisUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain

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