, Volume 2, Issue 4, pp 431–446 | Cite as

An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

  • Fuad Aleskerov
  • Daniel Karabekyan
  • M. Remzi Sanver
  • Vyacheslav Yakuba
Open Access
Original Article


We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.


Manipulability Positional voting rules Multiple choice Extended preferences 

JEL Classification




The work of Fuad Aleskerov and Daniel Karabekyan is partially supported by the Scientific Foundation of the Higher School of Economics (grants # 08-04-0008 and # 10-04-0030), Russian Foundation for Basic Research (grant # 08-01-00039a) and Laboratory DECAN of Higher School of Economics. Remzi Sanver acknowledges the support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP) and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) through the project # 107K560. The work of Vyacheslav Yakuba is also supported by Russian Foundation for Basic Research (grant # 08-01-00039a). William Zwicker took part at the very beginning of this project. His ideas and comments were very useful. We also thank an anonymous referee, whose comments allow us to improve the text.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2011

This article is published under license to BioMed Central Ltd. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fuad Aleskerov
    • 1
    • 2
  • Daniel Karabekyan
    • 1
  • M. Remzi Sanver
    • 3
  • Vyacheslav Yakuba
    • 2
  1. 1.National Research University Higher School of EconomicsMoscowRussia
  2. 2.Institute of Control SciencesRussian Academy of SciencesMoscowRussia
  3. 3.Istanbul Bilgi UniversityIstanbulTurkey

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