An individual manipulability of positional voting rules
We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.
KeywordsManipulability Positional voting rules Multiple choice Extended preferences
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