, Volume 2, Issue 4, pp 453–467 | Cite as

Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

  • Carmen Herrero
  • Ricardo Martínez
Open Access
Original Article


We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, non-manipulable, consistent, and balanced solutions. We refer those solutions as Temporary Satisfaction Methods,that can be viewed as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.


Allocation problem Indivisibilities Single-peaked preferences Priority standard Temporary satisfaction methods 

JEL Classification

D61 D63 D74 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2011

This article is published under license to BioMed Central Ltd. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico and Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones EconómicasUniversity of Alicante & IVIEAlicanteSpain
  2. 2.Departmento de Teoría e Historia EconómicaUniversity of MálagaMálagaSpain

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