Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked
We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when preferences are single-peaked. In this paper we identify the family of efficient, non-manipulable, consistent, and balanced solutions. We refer those solutions as Temporary Satisfaction Methods,that can be viewed as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called uniform rule.
KeywordsAllocation problem Indivisibilities Single-peaked preferences Priority standard Temporary satisfaction methods
JEL ClassificationD61 D63 D74
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