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Stopping rules as experimental design

  • Samuel C. FletcherEmail author
Paper in General Philosophy of Science
Part of the following topical collections:
  1. EPSA17: Selected papers from the biannual conference in Exeter

Abstract

A “stopping rule” in a sequential experiment is a rule or procedure for deciding when that experiment should end. Accordingly, the “stopping rule principle” (SRP) states that, in a sequential experiment, the evidential relationship between the final data and an hypothesis under consideration does not depend on the experiment’s stopping rule: the same data should yield the same evidence, regardless of which stopping rule was used. In this essay, I reconstruct and rebut five independent arguments for the SRP. Reminding oneself that the stopping rule is a part of an experiment’s design and is no more mysterious than many other design aspects helps elucidate why some of these arguments for the SRP are unsound.

Keywords

Stopping rules Optional stopping Likelihood principle Statistical evidence Experimental design Statistical testing 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Greg Gandenberger, Kasey Genin, Jonathan Livengood, Dan Malinksy, Conor Mayo-Wilson, Jan Sprenger, and an anonymous referee for comments on a previous version, and audiences at Minnesota, Munich, Bologna (SILFS2017), Edinburgh (BSPS2017), and Exeter (EPSA2017) for their insightful comments. Part of this work was completed with the support of a European Commission Marie Curie Fellowship (PIIF-GA-2013-628533).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Minnesota, Twin CitiesMinneapolisUSA

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