European Journal for Philosophy of Science

, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp 375–384 | Cite as

A note on “The no alternatives argument” by Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger

  • Frederik HerzbergEmail author


The defence of The No Alternatives Argument in a recent paper by R. Dawid, S. Hartmann and J. Sprenger (forthcoming in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; latest version: February 2013) rests on the assumption (among others) that the number of acceptable alternatives to a scientific hypothesis is independent of the complexity of the scientific problem. This note proves a generalisation of the main theorem by Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger, where this independence assumption is no longer necessary. Some of the other assumptions are also discussed, and the limitations of (this formalisation of) the no-alternatives argument are explored.


No alternatives argument Argument of no choice Bayesian confirmation theory Stochastic independence 


  1. Bovens, L, & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Dawid, R, Hartmann, S, Sprenger, J (2012). The no alternatives argument, Preprint.
  3. Dawid, R, Hartmann, S, Sprenger, J (2013). The no alternatives argument. Br J Philos Sci, forthcoming.
  4. Königsberger, K. (2001). Analysis 1 (5., neu bearbeitete Auflage). Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Mathematical EconomicsBielefeld UniversityBielefeldGermany
  2. 2.Munich Center for Mathematical EconomicsLudwig Maximilian University of MunichMunichGermany

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