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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 6, Issue 3, pp 409–425 | Cite as

The Problematic Welfare Standards of Behavioral Paternalism

  • Douglas Glen Whitman
  • Mario J. Rizzo
Article

Abstract

Behavioral paternalism raises deep concerns that do not arise in traditional welfare economics. These concerns stem from behavioral paternalism’s acceptance of the defining axioms of neoclassical rationality for normative purposes, despite having rejected them as positive descriptions of reality. We argue (1) that behavioral paternalists have indeed accepted neoclassical rationality axioms as a welfare standard; (2) that economists historically adopted these axioms not for their normative plausibility, but for their usefulness in formal and theoretical modeling; (3) that broadly rational individuals might fail to satisfy the axioms for various reasons, making them unpersuasive as normative criteria; and (4) that even if their violation did constitute irrationality, that would not justify paternalists’ choosing among inconsistent preferences to define an individual’s “true” preferences.

Keywords

Constitutive Rule Neoclassical Model Endowment Effect Welfare Standard Libertarian Paternalist 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics, David Nazarian College of Business and EconomicsCalifornia State University, NorthridgeLos AngelesUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsNew York UniversityNew YorkUSA

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