Advertisement

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 71–89 | Cite as

Hidden Nature Physicalism

  • William S. Robinson
Article
  • 90 Downloads

Abstract

Hidden nature physicalists hold that an experiential quality and its hidden nature are the same property – even though they agree that our experiences are of experiential qualities but are not, in the same sense, experiences of their hidden natures. This paper argues that physicalists must be committed to ultimately giving accounts that involve no non-extensional relations, and that this commitment leads to an inability to explain how our experiences could be of experiential qualities, but not of their hidden natures.

Keywords

Physical Individual Reflectance Profile Physical Relation Phenomenal Concept Experiential Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Stephen Biggs for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

References

  1. Chalmers, D.J. 2010. The character of consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Chalmers, D.J. 2012. Constructing the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Chisholm, R.M. 1992. Identity criteria for properties. Harvard Review of Philosophy 2(1): 14–16.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Chisholm, R., and W. Sellars. 1958. Chisholm-sellars correspondence on intentionality. In Concepts, theories, and the mind-body problem, Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol. 2, ed. H. Feigl, M. Scriven, and G. Maxwell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  5. Churchland, P.M. 1984. Matter and consciousness: A contemporary introduction to the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford.Google Scholar
  6. Churchland, P.S. 1998. Brainshy: Nonneural theories of conscious experience. In Toward a science of consciousness II: The second Tucson discussions and debates, ed. S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak and A. Scott, 109–126. Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford.Google Scholar
  7. Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  8. Fodor, J.A. 1987. Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford.Google Scholar
  9. Gennaro, R.J. 2012. The consciousness paradox. Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford.Google Scholar
  10. Goff, P. 2011. A posteriori physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(2): 191–209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Hill, C.S. 2009. Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Loar, B. 1990. Phenomenal states. In Philosophical perspectives 4, Action theory and the philosophy of mind, ed. J. Tomberlin. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co.Google Scholar
  14. Nida-Rümelin, M. 2007. Grasping phenomenal properties. In Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: New essays on consciousness and physicalism, ed. T. Alter and S. Walter. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Papineau, D. 2002. Thinking about consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Richardson, R.C., and G. Muilenberg. 1982. Sellars and sense impressions. Erkenntnis 17: 171–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Sellars, W. 1963. Science, perception and reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  18. Tye, M. 2009. Consciousness revisited. Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford.Google Scholar
  19. White, S. 2007. Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise. In Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: New essays on consciousness and physicalism, ed. T. Alter and S. Walter. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Iowa State UniversityAmesUSA

Personalised recommendations