Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 491–508 | Cite as

Mental Files in Development: Dual Naming, False Belief, Identity and Intensionality

  • Josef Perner
  • Brian Leahy


We use mental files to present an analysis of children's developing understanding of identity in alternative naming tasks and belief. The core assumption is that younger children below the age of about 4 years create different files for an object depending on how the object is individuated (e.g., as a rabbit or as an animal). They can anchor them to the same object, hence think of the same object whether they think of it as a rabbit or as an animal. However, the claim is, they cannot yet link their files to one another to represent that they have the same referent. Without linking the information contained in one file is not available in the other file. Hence, when thinking of the object as a rabbit (using the rabbit file) the information that it is also an animal is not available. For representing a person's belief about an object a vicarious file contains what the person believes about the object. To capture that the belief is about that object the vicarious file has to be linked to the regular file, which by assumption children younger than 4 years cannot do. This assumption can therefore explain why problems with alternative naming and understanding false beliefs are overcome at the same age.


Noun Phrase False Belief Task Mental File Discourse Referent Colour Control 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Cognitive NeuroscienceUniversity of SalzburgSalzburgAustria
  2. 2.Department of LinguisticsUniversity of KonstanzConstanceGermany

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