Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 6, Issue 4, pp 827–842 | Cite as

Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency

  • Cristina BorgoniEmail author


In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: (1) S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and (2) Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I examine three objections to their possibility. I suggest that the key to defending the possibility of epistemic akrasia is to explain condition (2). I finally argue that epistemic akrasia is possible, and that it represents a failure of mental agency.


Critical Reasoning Phenomenal Consciousness Epistemic Evaluation Mental Agency Contradictory Belief 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GrazGrazAustria

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