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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 5, Issue 4, pp 485–503 | Cite as

It’s the Knobe Effect, Stupid!

How (and How Not) to Explain the Side-Effect Effect
  • Hanno Sauer
Article

Abstract

People asymmetrically attribute various agential features such as intentionality, knowledge, or causal impact to other agents when something of normative significance is at stake. I will argue that three questions are of primary interest in the debate about this effect. A methodological question about how to explain it at all; a substantive question about how to explain it correctly: and a normative question about whether to explain it in terms of an error or a legitimate judgmental pattern. The problem, I argue, is that these three questions are difficult to disentangle. I propose a solution to this problem, and show how it accounts for the most recent data regarding the effect.

Keywords

True Belief Moral Consideration Causal Impact Normative Question Methodological Question 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.TilburgThe Netherlands

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