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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 5, Issue 3, pp 413–426 | Cite as

Feeling the Past: A Two-Tiered Account of Episodic Memory

  • Jérôme DokicEmail author
Article

Abstract

Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one’s own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing. The proposed two-tiered account is contrasted with other, reductionist two-tiered accounts as well as with reflexive accounts of episodic memory to be found in the literature.

Keywords

Episodic Memory Semantic Memory Memory Experience Intentional Mode Metacognitive Judgment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.École des Hautes Études en Sciences SocialesInstitut Jean-NicodParisFrance

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