Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 3, Issue 3, pp 383–403 | Cite as

The Phenomenal Stance Revisited

Article

Abstract

In this article, we present evidence of a bidirectional coupling between moral concern and the attribution of properties and states that are associated with experience (e.g., conscious awareness, feelings). This coupling is also shown to be stronger with experience than for the attribution of properties and states more closely associated with agency (e.g., free will, thoughts). We report the results of four studies. In the first two studies, we vary the description of the mental capacities of a creature, and assess the effects of these manipulations on moral concern. The third and fourth studies examine the effects of variations in moral concern on attributions of mindedness. Results from the first two studies indicate that moral concern depends primarily on the attribution of experience, rather than the attribution of agency. The results of the latter two studies demonstrate that moral concern increases attributions of mindedness, and that this effect is stronger for attributions of experience than for attributions of agency.

References

  1. Arico, A., B. Fiala, R.F. Goldberg, and S. Nichols. 2011. The folk psychology of consciousness. Mind and Language 26: 327–352.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bentham, J. 1789. Introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  3. Davis, M.H. 1980. A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. JSAS Catalog of Selected Documents in Psychology 10: 85.Google Scholar
  4. Dretske, F. 1991. Explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  5. Epley, N., S. Akalis, A. Waytz, and J.T. Cacioppo. 2008. Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: Loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds. Psychological Science 19: 114–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Fiala, B., A. Arico, and S. Nichols. 2011. On the psychological origins of dualism: Dual-process cognition and the explanatory gap. In Creating consilience: Integrating science and the humanities, ed. M. Collard and E. Slingerland. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Fiske, S.T., A.J. Cuddy, P. Glick, and J. Xu. 2002. A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82: 878–902.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Frederick, S. 2005. Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives 19: 25–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Gray, K., and D.M. Wegner. 2009. Moral typecasting: Divergent perceptions of moral agents and moral patients. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96: 505–520.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Gray, H., K. Gray, and D.M. Wegner. 2007. Dimensions of mind perception. Science 315: 619.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Haslam, N. 2006. Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology Review 10: 252–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Hughes, M.E., L.J. Waite, L.C. Hawkley, and J.T. Cacioppo. 2004. A short scale for measuring loneliness in large surveys: Results from two population-based studies. Research on Aging 26: 655–672.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Knobe, J. and J. J. Prinz. 2008. Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7: 67–83.Google Scholar
  14. Krämer, U.M., B. Mohammadi, N. Doñamayor, A. Samii, and T.F. Münte. 2010. Emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy and their relation to social cognition — an fMRI-study. Brain Research 1311: 110–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Leyens, J.Ph, P.M. Paladino, R.T. Rodriguez, J. Vaes, S. Demoulin, A.P. Rodriguez, and R. Gaunt. 2000. The emotional side of prejudice: The role of secondary emotions. Personality and Social Psychology Review 4: 186–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Paulhus, D.L., C.S. Neumann, and R.D. Hare. in press. Manual for the self-report psychopathy scale, 4th ed. Toronto: Multi-Health Systems.Google Scholar
  17. Robbins, P., and A.I. Jack. 2006. The phenomenal stance. Philosophical Studies 127: 59–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Schilbach, L., D. Bzdok, B. Timmermans, P.T. Fox, A.R. Laird, K. Vogeley, and S.B. Eickhoff. 2012. Introspective minds: Using ALE meta-analyses to study commonalities in the neural correlates of emotional processing, social and unconstrained cognition. PLoS One 7: e30920. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030920.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Searle, J. 1980. Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3: 417–457.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Shamay-Tsoory, S.G., J. Aharon-Peretz, and D. Perry. 2009. Two systems for empathy: A double dissociation between emotional and cognitive empathy in inferior frontal gyrus versus ventromedial prefrontal lesions. Brain 132: 617–627.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Smith, D.L. 2011. Less than human: Why we demean, enslave, and exterminate others. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Google Scholar
  22. Sytsma, J. and E. Machery. 2012. The two sources of moral standing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3.Google Scholar
  23. Zaki, J., and K.N. Ochsner. 2011. You, me, and my brain: Self and other representation in social cognitive neuroscience. In Social neuroscience: Toward understanding the underpinnings of the social mind, ed. A. Todorov, S.T. Fiske, and D. Prentice, 14–39. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departments of Cognitive Science (primary), Philosophy, Psychology, Bioethics, Neuroscience and NeurologyCase Western Reserve UniversityClevelandUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MissouriColumbiaUSA

Personalised recommendations