Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 145–169 | Cite as

Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults



We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.


Mental State Visual Experience Young Infant Perceptual State Folk Psychology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MemphisMemphisUSA
  2. 2.School of HumanitiesUniversity of HertfordshireHatfieldUK
  3. 3.Cognitive Evolution GroupUniversity of LouisianaLafayetteUSA

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