Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 145–169

Enactive and Behavioral Abstraction Accounts of Social Understanding in Chimpanzees, Infants, and Adults

Article
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Abstract

We argue against theory-of-mind interpretation of recent false-belief experiments with young infants and explore two other interpretations: enactive and behavioral abstraction approaches. We then discuss the differences between these alternatives.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MemphisMemphisUSA
  2. 2.School of HumanitiesUniversity of HertfordshireHatfieldUK
  3. 3.Cognitive Evolution GroupUniversity of LouisianaLafayetteUSA

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