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Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp 335–353 | Cite as

Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action

  • Olle Blomberg
Joint Action: What is Shared?

Abstract

According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exclusivity constraint, one cannot intend to perform another agent’s action, even if one might be able to intend that she performs it. For example, while one can intend that one’s guest leaves before midnight, one cannot intend to perform her act of leaving. However, Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) account of joint activity requires participants to have intentions-in-action (in John Searle’s (1983) sense) that violate this constraint. I argue that the exclusivity constraint should not be accepted as an unconditional constraint on the contents of intentions-in-action: one may intend to perform a basic action that belongs both to oneself and to another agent. Based on the phenomenology of tool use, I first argue that intentions-in-action of one’s basic actions may be technologically extended, meaning that their contents are not restricted to concern the agent’s bodily movements. In analogy with this, I then argue that the phenomenology of some skillful joint activities supports the idea that one’s basic intentions-in-action may be socially extended, in violation of the widely accepted exclusivity constraint. Tollefsen’s account is specifically constructed to account for the joint activities of infants and toddlers who lack the capacity to think of others as planning agents and grasp their plan-like intentions (a capacity required by Michael Bratman’s (1992, 1993, 2009a, b) influential account of joint activity). At the end of the paper, I raise some doubts regarding the extent to which infants and toddlers have socially extended intentions-in-action.

Keywords

Joint Activity Motor Imagery Body Schema Intentional Content Shared Intention 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

For critical comments, helpful suggestions and encouragement in response to earlier paper drafts and talks, I want to thank Natalie Gold, Steve Butterfill, Georg Theiner, Auke Pols, Andy Clark, Matt Nudds, Richard Harper, Ashley Taylor, and my audiences at the Collective Intentionality VII and European Society of Philosophy of Psychology 2010 conferences. I also want to thank two anonymous reviewers and the Edinburgh reading group on group agency (Orestis Palermos, Jonas Christensen, Eric Kerr, and Andy McKinlay) for helpful input, and Liz Irvine for proof-reading this paper. Finally, I am grateful to Microsoft Research for funding my PhD research.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language SciencesUniversity of EdinburghEdinburghUK

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