Review of Philosophy and Psychology

, Volume 1, Issue 2, pp 297–314

Accentuate the Negative

  • Joshua Alexander
  • Ronald Mallon
  • Jonathan M. Weinberg
Article

Abstract

Our interest in this paper is to drive a wedge of contention between two different programs that fall under the umbrella of “experimental philosophy”. In particular, we argue that experimental philosophy’s “negative program” presents almost as significant a challenge to its “positive program” as it does to more traditional analytic philosophy.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joshua Alexander
    • 1
  • Ronald Mallon
    • 2
  • Jonathan M. Weinberg
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySiena CollegeLoudonvilleUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of UtahSalt Lake CityUSA
  3. 3.Department of PhilosophyIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

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