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A budget feasible peer graded mechanism for iot-based crowdsourcing

  • Vikash Kumar Singh
  • Sajal Mukhopadhyay
  • Fatos XhafaEmail author
  • Aniruddh Sharma
Original Research
  • 38 Downloads

Abstract

We develop and extend a line of recent works on the design of mechanisms for heterogeneous tasks assignment problem in ’crowdsourcing’. The budgeted market we consider consists of multiple task requesters and multiple IoT devices as task executers. In this, each task requester is endowed with a single distinct task along with the publicly known budget. Also, each IoT device has valuations as the cost for executing the tasks and quality, which are private. Given such scenario, the objective is to select a subset of IoT devices for each task, such that the total payment made is within the allotted quota of the budget while attaining a threshold quality. For the purpose of determining the unknown quality of the IoT devices we have utilized the concept of peer grading. In this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful budget feasible mechanism for the problem under investigation that also allows us to have the true information about the quality of the IoT devices. Further, we have extended the set-up considering the case where the tasks are divisible in nature and the IoT devices are working collaboratively, instead of, a single entity for executing each task. We have designed the budget feasible mechanisms for the extended versions. The simulations are performed in order to measure the efficacy of our proposed mechanism.

Keywords

Crowdsourcing IoT devices Truthful Budget feasible Peer grading Shapley value 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We would like to thanks the research students and faculty members of the Department of CSE, NIT Durgapur for their valuable suggestions during the course of this work. Further, we would like to thank Prof. Y. Narahari and members of the Game Theory Lab. at IISc Bangalore for their suggestions and directions. Finally, we thank the Government of India Ministry of Human Resource Development for their Institute scholarship fund given to the Ph.D. scholars.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringNational Institute of Technology DurgapurDurgapurIndia
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversitat Politècnica de CatalunyaBarcelonaSpain
  3. 3.Qualcomm India Private Ltd.HyderabadIndia

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