We present a proposal as to how to create a Cognitive Machine. We start by raising a set of basic questions relevant to the creation of such a machine. These include the nature of human cognition and how it might be modelled, is consciousness crucial for cognition, and how might an autonomous cognitive agent impute the internal mental state of another such agent. In the following sections we propose a set of possible answers to these questions. The paper finishes with conclusions as to the most viable and interesting directions to be pursued to create cognitive machines.
KeywordsAutonomous agents Attention Emotion Consciousness Mental simulation Theory of mind
The author would like to thank the Cognitive Systems Unit of the EU for financial support through the GNOSYS project to create a cognitive robot (2004-7) and the MATHESIS project on Observational Learning (2006-9), as well as the EPSRC of the UK for support for developing a control model of attention (2003-6). He would also like to thank his numerous young colleagues involved in those projects for stimulating discussions.
- 1.Taylor JG. The mind: a user’s manual. Chichester: Wiley; 2006.Google Scholar
- 5.Taylor JG. CODAM: a model of attention leading to the creation of consciousness. Scholarpedia. 2007;2(11):1598.Google Scholar
- 8.Hartley M, Taylor JG. Towards a neural model of mental simulation. In: Kurková V, Neruda R, Koutník J, editors. Artificial neural networks – ICANN 2008, Proceedings. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 5163. Springer; 2008. p. 969–80. ISBN 978-3-540-87535-2.Google Scholar
- 11.Taylor JG, Kasderidis S, Trahanias P, Hartley M. A basis for cognitive machines. In: Kollias S, Stafylopatis A, Duch W, Oja E, editors. Artificial neural networks – ICANN 2006, Part I, Proceedings. Lecture notes in computer science, vol. 4131. Springer; 2006. p. 573–82. ISBN 13 978-3-540-38625-4.Google Scholar
- 15.Taylor NR, Taylor JG. The neural networks for language in the brain: creating LAD, ch. 9. In: Hecht-Nielsen R, McKenna T, editors. Computational models for neuroscience. London: Springer; 2003. p. 245–66.Google Scholar
- 16.Taylor JG, Taylor NR, Apolloni B, Orovas C. Constructing symbols as manipulable structures by recurrent networks proc ICANN 2002.Google Scholar
- 17.iTALK at http://www.italkproject.org/.
- 18.Hurley S, Nudds M, editors. Rational animals? Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006.Google Scholar
- 19.For results of the GNOSYS program see: http://www.cs.forth.gr/gnosys. Accessed 01 Jan 2009.
- 20.Damasio A. Descartes’ error. New York: Picador Press; 2000.Google Scholar
- 21.Taylor JG. The race for consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press; 1999.Google Scholar
- 23.LaBerge D. Defining awareness by the triangular circuit of attention. Psyche. 1998;4(7). .http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v4/psyche-4-07-laberge.html.
- 26.Zahavi D. Subjectivity & selfhood. Cambridge: MIT Press; 2005.Google Scholar
- 27.Sokolowski R. Introduction to phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2000.Google Scholar
- 28.Sartre J-P. Being and nothingness. London: Routledge; 1943. Google Scholar