Entry optimization using mixed integer linear programming
An appropriate selection of agents to participate in a confrontation such as a game or combat depends on the types of the opposing team. This paper investigates the problem of determining a combination of agents to fight in a combat between two forces. When the types of enemy agents committed to the combat are not known, game theory provides the best response to the opponent. The entry game is solved by using mixed integer linear programming (MILP) to consider the constraints on resources in a game theoretic approach. Simulations for the examples involving three different sets of military forces are performed using an optimization tool, which demonstrates that the optimal entry is properly selected corresponding to the opposing force.
KeywordsDecision making game theory military operation MILP (mixed integer linear programming) resource allocation
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