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Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik

, Volume 11, Issue 4, pp 581–601 | Cite as

Nukleare Rüstungskontrolle: Stand und zentrale Herausforderungen

  • Götz NeuneckEmail author
Jubiläumsbeitrag
  • 14 Downloads

Zusammenfassung

Nach der Hochzeit der Rüstungskontrolle führen Russland und die USA keine Rüstungskontrollverhandlungen mehr. Der INF-Vertrag und die Zukunft des New START-Vertrages sind in akuter Gefahr. Ein neues Wettrüsten zeichnet sich ab. Beide Seiten verfolgen kostspielige Programme, um ihre strategischen Arsenale zu ersetzen oder zu modernisieren. Neue militärtechnische Entwicklungen können die strategische Stabilität unterminieren. Dies hätte auch negative Auswirkungen auf das Nichtverbreitungsregime. Neue Rüstungskontrolle muss neue Akteure aus Drittstaaten, Raketenabwehr, präzisionsgeführte konventionelle Angriffssysteme und künftige Aktionen im Welt- und Cyberraum berücksichtigen.

Schlüsselwörter

Nuklearwaffen Strategische Rüstungskontrolle Abrüstung Nichtverbreitung Verifikation 

Nuclear Arms Control: Status and Major Challenges

Abstract

After the golden age of arms control, Russia and the USA no longer conduct arms control negotiations. The INF Treaty and the future of the New START Treaty are in danger. A new arms race is on the horizon. Both sides are pursuing costly programs to replace or modernize their strategic arsenals. New developments in military technology can undermine strategic stability. This would also have a negative impact on the non-proliferation regime. New arms control must take into account new actors from third countries, missile defense, precision-guided conventional attack systems and future actions in outer and cyberspace.

Keywords

Nuclear weapons Disarmament Strategic arms control Non-proliferation Verification 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH)HamburgDeutschland

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