Regulierung, Effizienz und das Anreizdilemma bei Investitionen in intelligente Netze
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Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel untersuchen wir aus theoretischer Sicht, inwiefern kosten- und anreizbasierte Regulierungsregime Investitionen incentivieren. Außerdem werden diese Regulierungsregime im Hinblick auf unterschiedliche Effizienzziele (allokative, produktive und dynamische Effizienz) betrachtet. Schließlich beleuchten wir, inwiefern vor dem Hintergrund Smart Grids Netzinnovationen durch ein bestimmtes Regulierungsregime stimuliert werden können und ob hierdurch auch dynamische Effizienzziele erreicht werden.
Schlüsselwörter
Investitionen Regulierung Smart Grids Dynamische EffizienzRegulation, efficiency and the incentive dilemma with investments in intelligent networks
Abstract
In this paper, we survey from a theoretical point of view to what extend cost-based and incentive-based regulatory regimes stimulate investments. For the purpose of this analysis, we furthermore differentiate by different efficiency measures, i.e. allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency and analyse to what extend each efficiency measure is stimulated by the regulatory regime. Eventually, we analyse to what extend regulatory incentives for network innovation in a smart grid context exist and to what extend different forms of regulation stimulate dynamic efficiency.
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