Annals of Telecommunications

, Volume 71, Issue 7–8, pp 287–297 | Cite as

Crowdsourced integrity verification of election results

An experience from Brazilian elections
  • Diego F. Aranha
  • Helder Ribeiro
  • André Luis Ogando Paraense
Article

Abstract

In this work, we describe an experiment for evaluating the integrity of election results, and improving transparency and voter participation in electronic elections. The idea was based on two aspects: distributed collection of poll tape pictures, taken by voters using mobile devices; and crowdsourced comparison of these pictures with the partial electronic results published by the electoral authority. The solution allowed voters to verify if results were correctly transmitted to the central tabulator without manipulation, with granularity of individual polling places. We present results, discuss limitations of the approach and future perspectives, considering the context of the previous Brazilian presidential elections of 2014, where the proposed solution was employed for the first time. In particular, with the aid of our project, voters were able to verify 1.6 % of the total poll tapes, amounting to 4.1 % of the total votes, which prompted the electoral authority to announce improved support for automated verification in the next elections. While the case study relies on the typical workflow of a paperless DRE-based election, the approach can be improved and adapted to other types of voting technology.

Keywords

Crowdsourcing Transparency Verification of election results 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the 1148 crowdfunding donators and more than 6000 mobile app users that made this project possible, and all the voters involved in the tedious task of comparing pictures with official elections results. We thank J. Alex Halderman for feedback regarding technical aspects of the project and moral support.

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Copyright information

© Institut Mines-Télécom and Springer-Verlag France 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Diego F. Aranha
    • 1
  • Helder Ribeiro
    • 1
  • André Luis Ogando Paraense
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of ComputingUniversity of CampinasCampinasBrazil

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