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Transactions of Tianjin University

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 162–167 | Cite as

Threat modeling-oriented attack path evaluating algorithm

  • Xiaohong Li (李晓红)Email author
  • Ran Liu (刘 然)
  • Zhiyong Feng (冯志勇)
  • Ke He (何 可)
Article

Abstract

In order to evaluate all attack paths in a threat tree, based on threat modeling theory, a weight distribution algorithm of the root node in a threat tree is designed, which computes threat coefficients of leaf nodes in two ways including threat occurring possibility and the degree of damage. Besides, an algorithm of searching attack path was also obtained in accordence with its definition. Finally, an attack path evaluation system was implemented which can output the threat coefficients of the leaf nodes in a target threat tree, the weight distribution information, and the attack paths. An example threat tree is given to verify the effectiveness of the algorithms.

Keywords

attack tree attack path threat modeling threat coefficient attack path evaluation 

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Copyright information

© Tianjin University and Springer-Verlag GmbH 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xiaohong Li (李晓红)
    • 1
    Email author
  • Ran Liu (刘 然)
    • 1
  • Zhiyong Feng (冯志勇)
    • 1
  • Ke He (何 可)
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and TechnologyTianjin UniversityTianjinChina

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