Board leadership structure and corporate headquarters location

  • Nilakshi BorahEmail author
  • Hui James


This study examines empirically if corporate headquarters location matters for board leadership structure under different asymmetric information settings. We examine the impact of corporate headquarters location on CEO duality for the period 1998–2013. Using the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) to define the location of corporate headquarters, we find that metropolitan firms are more likely to have CEO-Chairman duality than rural firms. Utilizing idiosyncratic risk and analyst forecast error or dispersion to proxy for information asymmetry, we find that metropolitan firms are more likely to have CEO-chairman duality than rural firms in the low information asymmetry setting. Our findings suggest that corporate headquarters location is an important determinant of board leadership structure.


Board leadership CEO-chairman duality Firm geography Information asymmetry 

JEL classification

G34 G38 



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Copyright information

© Academy of Economics and Finance 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of FinanceUniversity of Wisconsin-La CrosseLa CrosseUSA
  2. 2.University of Texas at Tyler, SCOB 360.05TylerUSA

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