Neuroethics

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 1–4 | Cite as

Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs

Original Paper

Abstract

Here I summarise the main arguments in “Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs” [1]. The book addresses the question whether there is a rationality constraint on belief ascription and defends a doxastic account of clinical delusions.

Keywords

Delusions Belief ascription Rationality Self-narratives 

References

  1. 1.
    Bortolotti, L. 2009. Delusions and other irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Jordan, H.W., E.W. Lockert, M. Johnson-Warren, C. Cabell, T. Cooke, W. Greer, and G. Howe. 2006. Erotomania revisited: Thirty-four years later. Journal of the National Medical Association 98(5): 787–793.Google Scholar
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    Lucchelli, F., and H. Spinnler. 2007. The case of lost Wilma: a clinical report of Capgras delusion. Neurological Science 28(4): 188–195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    McKay, R., and L. Cipolotti. 2007. Attributional styles in a case of Cotard delusion. Consciousness and Cognition 16: 349–359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of BirminghamEdgbastonUK

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