, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 5–11 | Cite as

Delusions as Forensically Disturbing Perceptual Inferences

  • Jakob Hohwy
  • Vivek Rajan
Original Paper


Bortolotti’s Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs defends the view that delusions are beliefs on a continuum with other beliefs. A different view is that delusions are more like illusions, that is, they arise from faulty perception. This view, which is not targeted by the book, makes it easier to explain why delusions are so alien and disabling but needs to appeal to forensic aspects of functioning.


Delusions Illusions Belief Perceptual inference Forensic 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentMonash UniversityMelbourneAustralia

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