Neuroethics

, Volume 6, Issue 2, pp 277–285

Pascal’s Wager and Deciding About the Life-Sustaining Treatment of Patients in Persistent Vegetative State

Original Paper

Abstract

An adaptation of Pascal’s Wager argument has been considered useful in deciding about the provision of life-sustaining treatment for patients in persistent vegetative state. In this article, I assess whether people making such decisions should resort to the application of Pascal’s idea. I argue that there is no sufficient reason to give it an important role in making the decisions.

Keywords

End of life decisions Life-sustaining treatment Pascal’s Wager Patient Persistent vegetative state 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Behavioural Sciences and PhilosophyUniversity of TurkuTurkuFinland

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