Neuroethics

, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 25–29 | Cite as

Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist

Original Paper

Abstract

This contribution to a symposium on an article by Roy Baumeister, A. William Crescioni, and Jessica Alquist focuses on a tension between compatibilist and incompatibilist elements in that article. In their discussion of people’s beliefs about free will, Baumeister et al. sometimes sound like incompatibilists; but in their presentation of their work on psychological processes of free will, they sound more like compatibilists than like incompatibilists. It is suggested that Baumeister and coauthors are attempting to study free will in a metaphysically neutral way and that, because this is so, the incompatibilist elements of the article are out of place.

Keywords

Compatibilism Decision Determinism Free will Incompatibilism Self-control 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Florida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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