, Volume 4, Issue 3, pp 223–234

Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s12152-010-9092-2

Cite this article as:
Fröding, B.E.E. Neuroethics (2011) 4: 223. doi:10.1007/s12152-010-9092-2


This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements (of the kind we have access to today or in the foreseeable future) on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues quite plausibly are both necessary and sufficient for the good life in theory, virtue ethics is often criticised for being elitist and unachievable in practice for the vast majority. Some cognitive enhancements, on the other hand, might be necessary for the good life but are far from sufficient for such an existence. Here it will be proposed that a combination of virtue and some cognitive enhancements is preferable.


Virtue Ethics Aristotle Cognitive Enhancement Moral virtue Epistemic virtue Neuro The good life Eudaimonia 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Lincoln CollegeOxfordUK

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