Neuroethics

, Volume 1, Issue 3, pp 205–212 | Cite as

Psychopathy and Criminal Responsibility

Article

Abstract

This article considers whether psychopaths should be held criminally responsible. After describing the positive law of criminal responsibility in general and as it applies to psychopaths, it suggests that psychopaths lack moral rationality and that severe psychopaths should be excused from crimes that violate the moral rights of others. Alternative forms of social control for dangerous psychopaths, such as involuntary civil commitment, are considered, and the potential legal implications of future scientific understanding of psychopathy are addressed.

Keywords

Psychopathy Legal responsibility Criminal responsibility Antisocial personality disorder Rationality Coercion 

References

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    Stephen J. Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 Legal Theory 265(1999).Google Scholar
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    American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Sec. 4.01(2)(1962).Google Scholar
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    E.g., Susan Wolf, Freedom Within Reason (1990).Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Paul Litton, Responsibility Status of the Psychopath: On Moral Reasoning and Rational Self-Governance 24–32(forthcoming, Rutgers L.R.; ms. on file with author). The argument in the text follows Litton.Google Scholar
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    Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 Virginia L.R. 1025 (2002).Google Scholar
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    Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).Google Scholar
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    Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).Google Scholar
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    Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Pennsylvania Law SchoolPhiladelphiaUSA

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