Resisting the Remnant-Person Problem
Some opponents of animalism have offered a relatively new worry: the remnant-person problem. After presenting the problem, I lay out several responses and show why they are either problematic or come with too many theoretical costs. I then present my own response to the problem, which unlike the other responses, it is one that can be adopted by animalists of any stripe. What I hope to show is that some of the key assumptions of the remnant-person problem can be rejected, and thus, the remnant-person problem should be seen as posing no threat to animalism.
Many thanks to Andrew Bailey, Stephan Blatti, Stephen T. Davis, Scott Davison, Paul Draper, and Jeremy Skrzypek for their helpful comments and criticisms on an earlier draft.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
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