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Absolutism About Taste and Faultless Disagreement

  • Marián ZouharEmail author
Article

Abstract

It is usually claimed that taste utterances have judge-dependent semantic content. Jeremy Wyatt recently proposed a semantic theory that rejects this claim. According to him, the semantic content of taste sentences is judge-independent, but the content of our assertions made by uttering taste sentences is judge-dependent. He showed that this account explains faultless disagreements about tastes. My paper aims to raise some challenges to his proposal. First, a judge-independent taste proposition semantically expressed by a taste sentence seems unrelated to a judge-dependent taste proposition asserted by the speaker. It means that the latter proposition is not systematically obtained from the former. Second, the theory assumes that there are judge-independent taste properties (like being tasty, full stop). The existence of such properties can be questioned because it is problematic to state instantiation conditions for them. The paper ends with a sketch of an alternative explanation; it shares Wyatt’s account of faultless disagreements but does not suffer from its drawbacks.

Keywords

Absolutism Contextualism Faultless disagreement Judge-dependent taste proposition Judge-independent taste proposition 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for Acta Analytica for her or his criticisms and useful suggestions.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that she has no conflict of interest.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Logic and Methodology of Sciences, Faculty of ArtsComenius UniversityBratislavaSlovakia

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