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Acta Analytica

, Volume 34, Issue 4, pp 505–514 | Cite as

A Non-substantial Meta-semantics for Global Expressivism

  • Henrik SovaEmail author
Article

Abstract

Huw Price’s neo-pragmatist programme of global expressivism (see Huw Price Naturalism Without Mirrors (2011) and Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism (2013)) faces a challenge—it is susceptible to the charge that the proposed combination of expressivism with a deflationary account of semantics leads to inconsistency. Expressivists about a particular discourse deny that it is representational. Global expressivists face the threat of inconsistency due to their attempts to generalise this denial to include the discourse of semantics. In this paper, I explicate two meta-semantic presuppositions of this charge. I argue that such an explication enables us to construct a consistent account of global expressivism. The key point is that global expressivists should adopt two truth predicates and treat meta-semantics as non-substantial. I argue that this framework provides us with a better grasp of Price’s response to the problem of inconsistency and enables global expressivists to accommodate the correspondence intuition.

Keywords

Global expressivism Representationalism Pragmatism Meta-semantics Truth predicate 

Notes

Funding Information

This research has been supported by the University of Tartu ASTRA Project PER ASPERA and the Centre of Excellence in Estonian Studies (European Regional Development Fund),and is related to research project IUT20-5 (Estonian Ministry of Education and Research).

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy and SemioticsTartu UniversityTartuEstonia

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