A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence
Many philosophers have offered arguments in favor of the following three theses: (i) A is epistemically permitted (or required) to believe P only if A is in a position to know that P, (ii) incoherent agents fail to satisfy the aforementioned knowledge norm of belief, and (iii) A’s apparent reasons are relevant to determining what A is blameworthy for believing. In this paper, I argue that the above three theses are jointly inconsistent. The main upshot of the paper is this: even if the knowledge norm of belief is correct, it cannot explain some deontic requirements governing belief.
KeywordsKnowledge Apparent reasons Coherence Blame Epistemic norms
I am grateful to Daniel Laurier, who has provided invaluable feedback on this paper.
This research was supported by the Groupe de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur la Normativité (GRIN) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (grant no. 767-2016-1771).
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest
Marc-Kevin Daoust declares that he has no conflict of interest.
This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of the authors.
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