Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth
Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
For helpful feedback, I thank Dave Fisher, Hao Hong, Mark Kaplan, Tufan Kiymaz, Adam Leite, Wade Monroe, Nick Montgomery, Tim O’Connor, Harrison Waldo, Phil Woodward, and an anonymous reviewer.
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Conflict of Interest Statement
That author declares that there are no conflicts of interest.
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