Garrett on the Irrationality of Pure Time Preferences
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In “Experience and Time,” Brian Garrett poses a challenge to friends of the rationality of pure time preferences. In this discussion note, we accept the challenge and provide two kinds of cases wherein some pure time preferences could be deemed rational.
KeywordsPure time preference Rationality Hedonic properties Time-bound preferences Time-sensitive preferences
My thanks go to Brian Garrett for interesting discussions on this topic over the years. For their useful comments and suggestions, I also thank Rene Betita, Robert James Boyles, Christine Calub, Mark Anthony Dacela, Fides del Castillo, Gina Espenilla, Adrianne John Galang, Leonila Gabiosa, Dante Leoncini, Jazmin Llana, Mary Grace Lopez, Cristina Loyola, Napoleon Mabaquiao, Zebedee Mateo, Jose Maria Arcadio Malbarosa, Benito Teehankee, this journal’s referee, and the students of my 2017–2018 class in Metaphysics. Special thanks to Hazel Biana for going over an earlier version of this work.
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Conflict of Interest
The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.
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