The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action
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In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of action and practical deliberation (Neta, Noûs 43:684–699, 2009; Gerken, Synthese 178:529–547, 2011, Synthese 189:373–394, 2012; Smithies, Noûs 46:265–288, 2012). I demonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However, a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to be ad hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practical deliberation.
KeywordsKnowledge Justification Action Practical deliberation Norms
Thanks to Santiago Echeverri, Robin McKenna and an anonymous referee for this journal for useful comments and discussion. The research work that lead to this article was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) grant number 100015_131794 (project “Knowledge, Evidence, and Practice”).
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