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Acta Analytica

, Volume 29, Issue 4, pp 441–456 | Cite as

Disbelieving the Normativity of Content

  • Víctor M. Verdejo
Article

Abstract

Adherents as well as detractors of the normativity of mental content agree that its assessment crucially depends on the assessment of a principle for believing what is true. In this paper, I present an alternative principle, which is based on possession conditions for pure thinking or mere entertaining. I argue that the alternative approach has not been sufficiently emphasised in the literature and has two important merits. First, it yields a direct analysis of the normativity of mental content, which is, furthermore, independent of arguably non-normative notions such as truth. Second, the approach suggests new and challenging lines of response to central non-normativist objections.

Keywords

Mental content Normativity of content Normativity of belief Inferential role semantics Possession conditions 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Åsa Wikforss, an anonymous referee for Acta Analytica, Javier González de Prado and the audiences of the 2012 ESPP and SLMFCE conferences, held in London and Santiago de Compostela respectively, for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this material. This work has received financial support from the Spanish government, through the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (research projects FFI2009-08828/FISO and FFI2012-35153) and from the Catalan government, via the consolidated research group GRECC (SGR2009-1528).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Santiago de CompostelaSantiago de CompostelaSpain

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