Acta Analytica

, Volume 29, Issue 3, pp 309–316 | Cite as

Is Personal Identity Analysable?



Trenton Merricks has argued that given endurantism personal identity is unanalysable in terms of psychological continuity, while Anthony Brueckner has argued against this claim. This article shows that neither philosopher has made a compelling case and also shows what it would take to settle the issue either way. It is then argued that whether personal identity is analysable or not may not be of crucial importance to those wanting to defend a psychological continuity approach to personal identity.


Personal identity Endurantism Trenton Merricks Psychological continuity theory 



Thanks to Murali Ramachandran. Thanks also to anonymous referees for some excellent comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySungkyunkwan UniversitySeoulSouth Korea

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