Acta Analytica

, Volume 29, Issue 2, pp 149–159 | Cite as

Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology

Article
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Abstract

My general aim in this paper is to shed light on the controversial concept of a bare particular. I do so by arguing that bare particulars are best understood in terms of the individuative work they do within the framework of a realist constituent ontology. I argue that outside such a framework, it is not clear that the notion of a bare particular is either motivated or coherent. This is suggested by reflection on standard objections to bare particulars. However, within the framework of a realist constituent ontology, bare particulars provide for a coherent theory of individuation—one with a potentially significant theoretical price tag, but one that also has advantages over rival theories.

Keywords

Bare particulars Constituent ontology Individuation Substance Realism Essences 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Peter van Inwagen and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Texas A&M UniversityCollege StationUSA

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