Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited
Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour the object on account of those properties that provide reason for favouring the object in the first place. While this expansion of the original proposal might seem intuitive given that favourings are discerning attitudes, it is nonetheless argued that proponents of the fitting-attitude analysis are in fact not served by such an expansion of the classical analysis. The objections raised here are relevant not only for advocates and critics of fitting-attitude analyses, but for anyone interested in the relation between normative reasons and motivation.
KeywordsAttitudinal content Buck-passing account Dual-role analysis Fitting-attitude analysis Motivating reason Normative reason Value
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the research seminar in practical philosophy at Lund University, at a symposium at Vrije University (VU), and at the 2012 Bled Philosophical Conference. I would like to thank all of the seminar, workshop and conference organizers and members—particularly Steven Arkonovich, Dan Egonsson, Mylan Engel, Ingvar Johansson, Simon Kirschin, Iddo Landau, Eugene Mills, Bert Musschenga, Alastair Norcross, Scott O’Leary, Matjaž Potrč, Björn Petersson, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Saul Smilansky, Bart Streumer and Andras Szigeti —for fruitful discussions and helpful suggestions. Also, many thanks to David Sobel for useful comments on a part of this paper, and to Stefaan Cuypers and Filip Buekens, with whom I discussed some of the ideas presented here during my visit to KU Leuven. My work was supported by a generous grant from the Swedish Research Council.
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