Acta Analytica

, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp 461–478 | Cite as

Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge



In this paper I argue, against some recent criticisms, that the factivity of “knows” does not support the traditional truth condition on knowledge. I articulate a conception of the factivity of “knows” on which it is a matter of cancelable pragmatic presupposition, and consider the epistemological implications of this.


Knowledge Presupposition Factive verbs 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of EdinburghEdinburghScotland

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