Acta Analytica

, Volume 27, Issue 1, pp 9–12 | Cite as

Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief



I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.


Moore’s paradox Assertion Consciousness Transparency Belief 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Social SciencesSingapore Management UniversitySingaporeSingapore

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