Acta Analytica

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 165–173

The Propositions We Assert

Article

Abstract

According to Scott Soames, proper names have no descriptive meaning. Nonetheless, Soames maintains that proper names are typically used to make descriptive assertions. In this paper, I challenge Soames’ division between meaning and what is asserted, first by arguing that competent speakers always make descriptive assertions with name-containing sentences, and then by defending an account of proper name meaning that accommodates this fact.

Keywords

Proper names Descriptions Assertion Propositions Meaning 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentWake Forest UniversityWinston-SalemUSA

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