Acta Analytica

, Volume 24, Issue 2, pp 139–148

Analyticity and the Analysis Relation

Article

Abstract

Quine famously argued that analyticity is indefinable, since there is no good account of analyticity in terms of synonymy, and intensions are of no help since there are no intensions. Yet if there are intensions, the question still remains as to the right account of analyticity in terms of them. On the assumption that intensions must be admitted, the present paper considers two such accounts. The first analyzes analyticity in terms of concept identity, and the second analyzes analyticity in terms of the analysis relation. The first fails in light of possible counterexamples. The second is defended, both by considering test cases of intuitively clear analyticities, and by developing the account in light of possible counterexamples.

Keywords

Analyticity Analysis Intensions Concepts Conceptual analysis 

References

  1. Earl, D. (2007). A semantic resolution of the paradox of analysis. Acta Analytica, 22(3), 189–205.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Hanna, R. (2001). Kant and the foundations of analytic philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  3. Katz, J. J. (1988). Cogitations: A study of the cogito in relation to the philosophy of logic and language and a study of them in relation to the cogito. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Katz, J. J. (1992). The new intensionalism. Mind, 101(404), 689–719.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Katz, J. J. (1997). Analyticity, necessity, and the epistemology of semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57(1), 1–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Putnam, H. (1966). The analytic and the synthetic. In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol. III (pp. 358–397). Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  7. Putnam, H. (1970). Is semantics possible? In H. Keifer & M. Munitz (Eds.), Language, belief, and metaphysics (pp. 50–63). New York: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
  8. Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of ‘meaning’. In K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol. VII (pp. 131–193). Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  9. Quine, W. V. O. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 60, 20–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Quine, W. V. O. (1976). Carnap and logical truth. In W. V. O. Quine (Ed.), The ways of paradox and other essays (pp. 107–132). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Shapiro, S. (2000). The status of logic. In P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (Eds.), New essays on the a priori (pp. 333–365). Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Religious StudiesCoastal Carolina UniversityConwayUSA

Personalised recommendations