Acta Analytica

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 187–205

A Warranted-assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism


DOI: 10.1007/s12136-008-0034-0

Cite this article as:
Black, T. Acta Anal (2008) 23: 187. doi:10.1007/s12136-008-0034-0


According to a Moorean response to skepticism, the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively low, and we can know across contexts all that we ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p, it can seem that S does in fact lack that piece of knowledge. Moreover, this warranted-assertability maneuver is unique and better than similar maneuvers because it makes use of H. P. Grice’s general conversational rule of Quantity—“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”—in explaining why we are warranted in asserting that S doesn’t know that p.


Warranted-assertability Mooreanism  Skepticism Knowledge 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State UniversityNorthridgeUSA

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